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Abstract. Harassment by cyberbullies is a significant phenomenon on
the social media. Existing works for cyberbullying detection have at least
one of the following three bottlenecks. First, they target only one partic-
ular social media platform (SMP). Second, they address just one topic of
cyberbullying. Third, they rely on carefully handcrafted features of the
data. We show that deep learning based models can overcome all three
bottlenecks. Knowledge learned by these models on one dataset can be
transferred to other datasets. We performed extensive experiments using
three real-world datasets: Formspring (˜12k posts), Twitter (˜16k posts),
and Wikipedia(˜100k posts). Our experiments provide several useful in-
sights about cyberbullying detection. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work that systematically analyzes cyberbullying detection on
various topics across multiple SMPs using deep learning based models
and transfer learning.
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1 Introduction
Cyberbullying has been defined by the National Crime Prevention Council as
the use of the Internet, cell phones or other devices to send or post text or images
intended to hurt or embarrass another person. Various studies have estimated
that between to 10% to 40% of internet users are victims of cyberbullying [17].
Effects of cyberbullying can range from temporary anxiety to suicide[4]. Many
high profile incidents have emphasized the prevalence of cyberbullying on social
media. Most recently in October 2017, a Swedish model Arvida Bystro¨m was
cyberbullied to the extent of receiving rape threats after she appeared in an
advertisement with hairy legs1.
Detection of cyberbullying in social media is a challenging task. Definition
of what constitutes cyberbullying is quite subjective. For example, frequent use
of swear words might be considered as bullying by the general population. How-
ever, for teen oriented social media platforms such as Formspring, this does not
necessarily mean bullying (Table 2). Across multiple SMPs, cyberbullies attack
victims on different topics such as race, religion, and gender. Depending on the
1 BBC News Article https://goo.gl/t6hQ7c
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topic of cyberbullying, vocabulary and perceived meaning of words vary signif-
icantly across SMPs. For example, in our experiments we found that for word
‘fat’, the most similar words as per Twitter dataset are ‘female’ and ‘woman’
(Table 8). However, other two datasets do not show such particular bias against
women. This platform specific semantic similarity between words is a key aspect
of cyberbullying detection across SMPs. Style of communication varies signifi-
cantly across SMPs. For example, Twitter posts are short and lack anonymity.
Whereas posts on Q&A oriented SMPs are long and have option of anonymity
(Table 1). Fast evolving words and hashtags in social media make it difficult to
detect cyberbullying using swear word list based simple filtering approaches. The
option of anonymity in certain social networks also makes it harder to identify
cyberbullying as profile and history of the bully might not be available.
Past works on cyberbullying detection have at least one of the following
three bottlenecks. First (Bottleneck B1), they target only one particular social
media platform. How these methods perform across other SMPs is unknown.
Second (Bottleneck B2), they address only one topic of cyberbullying such as
racism, and sexism. Depending on the topic, vocabulary and nature of cyber-
bullying changes. These models are not flexible in accommodating changes in
the definition of cyberbullying. Third (Bottleneck B3), they rely on carefully
handcrafted features such as swear word list and POS tagging. However, these
handcrafted features are not robust against variations in writing style. In con-
trast to existing bottlenecks, this work targets three different types of social
networks (Formspring: a Q&A forum, Twitter: microblogging, and Wikipedia:
collaborative knowledge repository) for three topics of cyberbullying (personal
attack, racism, and sexism) without doing any explicit feature engineering by
developing deep learning based models along with transfer learning.
We experimented with diverse traditional machine learning models (logistic
regression, support vector machine, random forest, naive Bayes) and deep neural
network models (CNN, LSTM, BLSTM, BLSTM with Attention) using variety of
representation methods for words (bag of character n-gram, bag of word unigram,
GloVe embeddings, SSWE embeddings). Summary of our findings and research
contributions is as follows.
– This the first work that systematically analyzes cyberbullying on various
topics across multiple SMPs and applies transfer learning for cyberbullying
detection task.
– Presence of swear words is neither necessary nor sufficient for cyberbullying.
Robust models for cyberbullying detection should not rely on such hand-
crafted features.
– Deep Learning based models outperform traditional Machine Learning mod-
els for cyberbullying detection task.
– Training datasets for cyberbullying detection contain only a few posts marked
as a bullying. This class imbalance problem can be tackled by oversampling
the rare class.
– The vocabulary of words used for cyberbullying and their interpretation
varies significantly across SMPs.
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Table 1. Dataset Statistics
Dataset # Posts Classes Length @95% Max Length Vocabulary size Source
FormSpring 12k 2 62 1115 6058 [12]
Twitter 16k 3 26 38 5653 [16]
Wikipedia 100k 2 231 2846 55262 [18]
2 Datasets
Please refer to Table 1 for summary of datasets used. We performed experiments
using large, diverse, manually annotated, and publicly available datasets for
cyberbullying detection in social media. We cover three different types of social
networks: teen oriented Q&A forum (Formspring), large microblogging platform
(Twitter), and collaborative knowledge repository (Wikipedia talk pages). Each
dataset addresses a different topic of cyberbullying. Twitter dataset contains
examples of racism and sexism. Wikipedia dataset contains examples of personal
attack. However, Formspring dataset is not specifically about any single topic.
All three datasets have the problem of class imbalance where posts labeled as
cyberbullying are in the minority as compared to neutral posts. Variation in the
number of posts across datasets also affects vocabulary size that represents the
number of distinct words encountered in the dataset. We measure the size of a
post in terms of the number of words in the post. For each dataset, there are
only a few posts with large size. We truncate such large posts to the size of post
ranked at 95 percentile in that dataset. For example, in Wikipedia dataset, the
largest post has 2846 words. However, size of post ranked at 95 percentile in
that dataset is only 231. Any post larger than size 231 in Wikipedia dataset will
be truncated by considering only first 231 words. This truncation affects only
a small minority of posts in each dataset. However, it is required for efficiently
training various models in our experiments. Details of each dataset are as follows.
Formspring [12]: It was a question and answer based website where users
could openly invite others to ask and answer questions. The dataset includes
12K annotated question and answer pairs. Each post is manually labeled by
three workers. Among these pairs, 825 were labeled as containing cyberbullying
content by at least two Amazon Mechanical turk workers.
Twitter [16]: This dataset includes 16K annotated tweets. The authors boot-
strapped the corpus collection, by performing an initial manual search of com-
mon slurs and terms used pertaining to religious, sexual, gender, and ethnic
minorities. Of the 16K tweets, 3117 are labeled as sexist, 1937 as racist, and the
remaining are marked as neither sexist nor racist.
Wikipedia [18]: For each page in Wikipedia, a corresponding talk page main-
tains the history of discussion among users who participated in its editing.
This data set includes over 100k labeled discussion comments from English
Wikipedia’s talk pages. Each comment was labeled by 10 annotators via Crowd-
flower on whether it contains a personal attack. There are total 13590 comments
labeled as personal attack.
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Table 2. Swear Word Use and Anonymity
Dataset P(B) P(S) P(A) P(B|S) P(S|B) P(B|A) P(A|B) P(S|A) P(B| (A&S))
FormSpring 0.06 0.16 0.53 0.22 0.59 0.08 0.71 0.20 0.25
Twitter 0.31 0.13 - 0.42 0.18 - - - -
Wikipedia 0.12 0.17 0.27 0.49 0.69 0.25 0.56 0.27 0.65
2.1 Use of Swear Words and Anonymity
Please refer to Table 2. We use the following short forms in this section: B=Bullying,
S=Swearing, A=Anonymous. Some of the values for Twitter dataset are unde-
fined as Twitter does not allow anonymous postings. Use of swear words has been
repeatedly linked to cyberbullying. However, preliminary analysis of datasets re-
veals that depending on swear word usage can neither lead to high precision nor
high recall for cyberbullying detection. Swear word list based methods will have
low precision as P(B|S) is not close to 1. In fact, for teen oriented social network
Formspring, 78% of the swearing posts are non-bullying. Swear words based fil-
tering will be irritating to the users in such SMPs where swear words are used
casually. Swear word list based methods will also have a low recall as P(S|B) is
not close to 1. For Twitter dataset, 82% of bullying posts do not use any swear
words. Such passive-aggressive cyberbullying will go undetected with swear word
list based methods. Anonymity is another clue that is used for detecting cyber-
bullying as bully might prefer to hide its identity. Anonymity definitely leads to
increased use of swear words (P(S|A) ≥ P(S)) and cyberbullying (P(B|A)≥P(B),
and P(B|(A&S))≥P(B)). However, significant fraction of anonymous posts are
non-bullying (P(B|A) not close to 1) and many of bullying posts are not anony-
mous (P(A|B) not close to 1). Further, anonymity might not be allowed by many
SMPs such as Twitter.
3 Related Work
Cyberbullying is recognized as a phenomenon at least since 2003 [13]. Use of
social media exploded with launching of multiple platforms such as Wikipedia
(2001), MySpace (2003), Orkut (2004), Facebook (2004), and Twitter (2005).
By 2006, researchers had pointed that cyberbullying was as serious phenomenon
as offline bullying [10]. However, automatic detection of cyberbullying was ad-
dressed only since 2009 [19]. As a research topic, cyberbullying detection is a text
classification problem. Most of the existing works fit in the following template:
get training dataset from single SMP, engineer variety of features with certain
style of cyberbullying as the target, apply a few traditional machine learning
methods, and evaluate success in terms of measures such as F1 score and ac-
curacy. These works heavily rely on handcrafted features such as use of swear
words. These methods tend to have low precision for cyberbullying detection as
handcrafted features are not robust against variations in bullying style across
SMPs and bullying topics. Only recently, deep learning has been applied for
cyberbullying detection [2]. Table 10 summarizes important related work.
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Fig. 1. Model Architecture
4 Deep Neural Network (DNN) Based Models
We experimented with four DNN based models for cyberbullying detection:
CNN, LSTM, BLSTM, and BLSTM with attention. These models are listed
in the increasing complexity of their neural architecture and amount of infor-
mation used by these models. Please refer to Figure 1 for general architecture
that we have used across four models. Various models differ only in the Neural
Architecture layer while having identical rest of the layers. CNNs are provid-
ing state-of-the-results on extracting contextual feature for classification tasks
in images, videos, audios, and text. Recently, CNNs were used for sentiment
classification [7]. Long Short Term Memory networks are a special kind of RNN,
capable of learning long-term dependencies. Their ability to use their internal
memory to process arbitrary sequences of inputs has been found to be effective
for text classification[5]. Bidirectional LSTMs[20] further increase the amount of
input information available to the network by encoding information in both for-
ward and backward direction. By using two directions, input information from
both the past and future of the current time frame can be used. Attention mech-
anisms allow for a more direct dependence between the state of the model at
different points in time. Importantly, attention mechanism lets the model learn
what to attend to based on the input sentence and what it has produced so far.
The embedding layer processes a fixed size sequence of words. Each word
is represented as a real-valued vector, also known as word embeddings. We
have experimented with three methods for initializing word embeddings: ran-
dom, GloVe[11], and SSWE[14]. During the training, model improves upon the
initial word embeddings to learn task specific word embeddings. We have ob-
served that these task specific word embeddings capture the SMP specific and
topic specific style of cyberbullying. Using GloVe vectors over random vector
initialization has been reported to improve performance for some NLP tasks.
Most of the word embedding methods such as GloVe, consider only syntactic
context of the word while ignoring the sentiment conveyed by the text. SSWE
method overcomes this problem by incorporating the text sentiment as one of
the parameters for word embedding generation. We experimented with various
dimension size for word embeddings. Experimental results reported here are with
dimension size as 50. There was no significant variation in results with dimension
size ranging from 30 to 200.
To avoid overfitting, we used two dropout layers, one before the neural archi-
tecture layer and one after, with dropout rates of 0.25 and 0.5 respectively. Fully
connected layer is a dense output layer with the number of neurons equal to the
number of classes, followed by softmax layer that provides softmax activation.
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Table 3. Results for Traditional ML Models Using F1 Score
Dataset label Character n-grams Word unigrams
LR SVM RF NB LR SVM RF NB
Formspring bully 0.448 0.422 0.298 0.359 0.489 0.463 0.264 0.025
Twitter racism 0.723 0.676 0.752 0.686 0.738 0.772 0.739 0.617
sexism 0.729 0.688 0.720 0.647 0.762 0.758 0.755 0.635
Wiki Attack 0.694 0.677 0.674 0.655 0.711 0.686 0.730 0.659
All our models are trained using backpropagation. The optimizer used for train-
ing is Adam and the loss function is categorical cross-entropy. Besides learning
the network weights, these methods also learn task-specific word embeddings
tuned towards the bullying labels (See Section 5.3). Our code is available at:
https://github.com/sweta20/Detecting-Cyberbullying-Across-SMPs.
5 Experiments
Existing works have heavily relied on traditional machine learning models for
cyberbullying detection. However, they do not study the performance of these
models across multiple SMPs. We experimented with four models: logistic re-
gression (LR), support vector machine (SVM), random forest (RF), and naive
Bayes (NB), as these are used in previous works (Table 10). We used two data
representation methods: character n-gram and word unigram. Past work in the
domain of detecting abusive language have showed that simple n-gram features
are more powerful than linguistic and syntactic features, hand-engineered lex-
icons, and word and paragraph embeddings[9]. As compared to DNN models,
performance of all four traditional machine learning models was significantly
lower. Please refer to Table 3.
All DNN models reported here were implemented using Keras. We pre-
process the data, subjecting it to standard operations of removal of stop words,
punctuation marks and lowercasing, before annotating it to assigning respective
labels to each comment. For each trained model, we report its performance after
doing five-fold cross-validation. We use following short forms.
– Datasets: F (Formspring), T (Twitter), W (Wikipedia)
– Datasets with oversampling of bullying posts: F+ (Formspring), T+ (Twit-
ter), W+ (Wikipedia)
– Evaluation measures: P (Precision), R (Recall), F1 (F1 score)
– DNN Models: M1 (CNN), M2 (LSTM), M3 (BLSTM), M4 (BLSTM with
attention)
5.1 Effect of Oversampling Bullying Instances
The training datasets had a major problem of class imbalance with posts marked
as bullying in the minority. As a result, all models were biased towards labeling
the posts as non-bullying. To remove this bias, we oversampled the data from
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Table 4. Effect of Oversampling Bullying Posts using BLSTM with attention
Dataset Label P R F1
Random Glove SSWE Random Glove SSWE Random Glove SSWE
F bully 0.52 0.56 0.63 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.44 0.51 0.47
F+ bully 0.84 0.85 0.90 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91
T racism 0.67 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.75 0.76
T+ racism 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93
T sexism 0.65 0.86 0.83 0.64 0.52 0.47 0.65 0.65 0.59
T+ sexism 0.88 0.95 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.90
W attack 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.67 0.68 0.76 0.74 0.74
W+ attack 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.87
bullying class thrice. That is, we replicated bullying posts thrice in the training
data. This significantly improved the performance of all DNN models with major
leap in all three evaluation measures. Table 4 shows the effect of oversampling for
a variety of word embedding methods with BLSTM Attention as the detection
model. Results for other models are similar [1]. We can notice that oversampled
datasets (F+, T+, W+) have far better performance than their counterparts (F,
T, W respectively). Oversampling particularly helps the smallest dataset Form-
spring where number of training instances for bullying class is quite small (825)
as compared to other two datasets (about 5K and 13K). We also experimented
with varying the replication rate for bullying posts [1]. However, we observed
that for bullying posts, replication rate of three is good enough.
5.2 Choice of Initial Word Embeddings and Model
Initial word embeddings decide data representation for DNN models. However
during the training, DNN models modify these initial word embeddings to learn
task specific word embeddings. We have experimented with three methods to
initialize word embeddings. Please refer to Table 5. This table shows the effect
of varying initial word embeddings for multiple DNN models across datasets.
We can notice that initial word embeddings do not have a significant effect on
cyberbullying detection when oversampling of bullying posts is done (rows corre-
sponding to F+, T+, W+). In the absence of oversampling (rows corresponding
to F, T W), there is a gap in performance of simplest (CNN) and most complex
(BLSTM with attention) models. However, this gap goes on reducing with the
increase in the size of datasets.
Table 6 compares the performance of four DNN models for three evaluation
measures while using SSWE as the initial word embeddings. We have noticed
that most of the time LSTM performs weaker than other three models. However,
performance gap in the other three models is not significant.
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Table 5. Effect of Choosing Initial Word Embedding Method on F1 Score
Dataset Label Random Glove SSWE
M1 M4 M1 M4 M1 M4
F bully 0.30 0.44 0.34 0.51 0.34 0.47
F+ bully 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.91
T racism 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.70 0.76
T+ racism 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.93
T sexism 0.59 0.65 0.61 0.65 0.63 0.59
T+ sexism 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.90
W Attack 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.74
W+ Attack 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87
Table 6. Performance Comparison of Various DNN Models
Dataset Label P R F1
M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
F+ bully 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.91
T+ racism 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.80 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.85 0.93 0.93
sexism 0.92 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.90
W+ Attack 0.92 0.70 0.90 0.87 0.83 0.54 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.61 0.85 0.87
5.3 Task Specific Word Embeddings
DNN models learn word embeddings over the training data. These learned em-
beddings across multiple datasets show the difference in nature and style of bul-
lying across cyberbullying topics and SMPs. Here we report results for BLSTM
with attention model. Results for other models are similar. We first verify that
important words for each topic of cyberbullying form clusters in the learned
embeddings. To enable the visualization of grouping, we reduced dimensionality
with t-SNE [8], a well-known technique for dimensionality reduction particu-
larly well suited for visualization of high dimensional datasets. Please refer to
Table 7. This table shows important clusters observed in t-SNE projection of
learned word embeddings. Each cluster shows that words most relevant to a
particular topic of bullying form cluster.
Table 7. Embeddings learned using DNNs
Bullying form Observed Cluster
Sexism kitchen, feminist, feminists, its, feminism, girl, rights, two, fe-
male, bitch, head, sexist, woman, girls, blondes, rape
Racism pedophile, murdered, either, israel, mohammed, slave, prophet,
muslims, quran, may, islam, religion, war, pay
Personal Attack fuck, fucking, u, little, you, shit, style, faggot, ass, off, changes,
suck, see, hate, know, nigger, moron, site
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Table 8. Most similar words to the query word across platform
Query word Similar words
Twitter Wiki
slave feminists, religion, jews, islam,
muslims, christians
sucks, bad, blocked, tried, can-
not, can’t, didn’t, never
evidence god, opinion, eliminated, opin-
ions, murdered, racist, raped
interested, suggest, yes, love,
good, happy, quote, note, useful
fat female, woman, face, women,
kids, fan, blonde, friends
blocked, sorry, bad, used, tried,
cannot, banned, never, fuck
gay die, ask, fake, child, babies, fe-
males, wife, female, woman
bad, sorry, used, blocked, tried,
fuck, fucking, that’s, notice, shit
We also observed changes in the meanings of the words across topics of
cyberbullying. Table 8 shows most similar words for a given query word for two
datasets. Twitter dataset which is heavy on sexism and racism, considers word
slave as similar to targets of racism and sexism. However, Wikipedia dataset
that is about personal attacks does not show such bias.
5.4 Transfer Learning
We used transfer learning to check if the knowledge gained by DNN models
on one dataset can be used to improve cyberbullying detection performance on
other datasets. We report results where BLSTM with attention is used as the
DNN model. Results for other models are similar [1]. We experimented with
following three flavors of transfer learning.
Complete Transfer Learning (TL1): In this flavor, a model trained on one
dataset was directly used to detect cyberbullying in other datasets without
any extra training. TL1 resulted in significantly low recall indicating that three
datasets have different nature of cyberbullying with low overlap (Table 9).
However precision was relatively higher for TL1, indicating that DNN models
are cautious in labeling a post as bully (Table 9). TL1 also helps to mea-
sure similarity in nature of cyberbullying across three datasets. We can observe
that bullying nature in Formspring and Wikipedia datasets is more similar to
each other than the Twitter dataset. This can be inferred from the fact that
with TL1, cyberbullying detection performance for Formspring dataset is higher
when base model is Wikipedia (precision =0.51 and recall=0.66)as compared
to Twitter as the base model (precision=0.38 and recall=0.04). Similarly, for
Wikipedia dataset, Formspring acts as a better base model than Twitter while
using TL1 flavor of transfer learning. Nature of SMP might be a factor behind
this similarity in nature of cyberbullying. Both Formspring and Wikipedia are
task oriented social networks (Q&A and collaborative knowledge repository re-
spectively) that allow anonymity and larger posts. Whereas communication on
Twitter is short, free of anonymity and not oriented towards a particular task.
Feature Level Transfer Learning (TL2): In this flavor, a model was trained
on one dataset and only learned word embeddings were transferred to another
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Table 9. Comparison of Transfer Learning Methods Using Precision
Metric
Test
Train
F+ T+ W+
TL1 TL2 TL3 TL1 TL2 TL3 TL1 TL2 TL3
Precision
F - - - 0.38 0.90 0.88 0.51 0.92 0.85
T 0.83 0.88 0.90 - - - 0.72 0.91 0.90
W 0.82 0.92 0.91 0.68 0.90 0.91 - - -
Recall
F - - - 0.04 0.98 0.98 0.66 0.98 0.99
T 0.01 0.99 0.99 - - - 0.17 0.98 0.99
W 0.21 0.96 0.96 0.05 0.97 0.96 - - -
F1-score
F - - - 0.07 0.95 0.93 0.58 0.95 0.92
T 0.03 0.93 0.94 - - - 0.28 0.94 0.94
W 0.35 0.94 0.94 0.10 0.94 0.94 - - -
dataset for training a new model. As compared to TL1, recall score improved
dramatically with TL2 (Table 9). Improvement in precision was also significant
(Table 9). These improvements indicate that learned word embeddings are an
essential part of knowledge transfer across datasets for cyberbullying detection.
Model Level Transfer Learning (TL3): In this flavor, a model was trained on
one dataset and learned word embeddings, as well as network weights, were
transferred to another dataset for training a new model. TL3 does not result
in any significant improvement over TL2. This lack of improvement indicates
that transfer of network weights is not essential for cyberbullying detection and
learned word embeddings is the key knowledge gained by the DNN models.
DNN based models coupled with transfer learning beat the best-known re-
sults for all three datasets. Previous best F1 scores for Wikipedia [18] and Twit-
ter [2] datasets were 0.68 and 0.93 respectively. We achieve F1 scores of 0.94
for both these datasets using BLSTM with attention and feature level transfer
learning (Table 9). For Formspring dataset, authors have not reported F1 score.
Their method has accuracy score of 78.5% [12]. We achieve F1 score of 0.95 with
accuracy score of 98% for the same dataset.
5.5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown that DNN models can be used for cyberbullying detection on
various topics across multiple SMPs using three datasets and four DNN models.
These models coupled with transfer learning beat state of the art results for
all three datasets. These models can be further improved with extra data such
as information about the profile and social graph of users. Most of the current
datasets do not provide any information about the severity of bullying. If such
fine-grained information is made available, then cyberbullying detection models
can be further improved to take a variety of actions depending on the perceived
seriousness of the posts.
Deep Learning for Detecting Cyberbullying 11
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